Half-monthly Talk ｜ Upgrading Biosafety Strategy
Tianjin University Biosafety Strategy Research Center
On February 14th, at the 12th meeting of the Central Committee for Comprehensively Deepening Reform, General Secretary of the Supreme Leader pointed out that it is necessary to incorporate biosafety into the national security system, systematically plan the construction of the national biosafety risk prevention and control and governance system, and comprehensively improve the national biosafety governance capacity. It is a very urgent task to improve the long-term mechanism of preventing and responding to biosafety threats in China and guard against major biosafety risks that may occur in the future.
Chengdu Customs strengthens Covid-19 nucleic acid detection for entry-exit personnel. Liu Kun/photo
Facing five major risks
First, the threat situation of new sudden large-scale infectious diseases in the world has not been fundamentally changed, and its spread and spread speed are increasing day by day.
The successive outbreaks of H1N1 influenza virus, Ebola virus, African swine fever and COVID-19 virus in recent ten years show that the new large-scale infectious diseases in the world have entered a period of historical high incidence. In 2018, WHO proposed that "X disease" with multiple sources in the future may endanger millions of lives. Including large-scale urbanization, transnational population mobility, global warming, pathogen evolution and other factors, the threat of the spread and spread of new infectious diseases is increasing, making it more difficult to prevent and control the epidemic situation, such as early warning, monitoring, diagnosis, drug research and development, and pathogen traceability.
Second, the risk of misuse, abuse and misuse of new dual-use biotechnology in the world has intensified.
The new dual-use biotechnology, represented by synthetic biology and genome editing technology, on the one hand clears the technical obstacles for artificial design and transformation of pathogens, on the other hand, it greatly lowers the technical threshold, and makes it easier to carry, manufacture and process biological agents and toxins, which intensifies the concealment of technical misuse, abuse and misuse, and poses a major challenge to biosafety supervision.
Third, the real threat of global biological weapons and bioterrorism.
In the absence of an effective verification mechanism in the Biological Weapons Convention, there is an undercurrent of international biological arms control. At the same time, the progress of biotechnology also leads to the uncertainty of pathogen types, biological threat sources and delivery methods related to bioterrorism, which makes it difficult to eradicate bioterrorism, and the tracing back to the source faces severe challenges, making it more difficult to defend against emerging bioterrorism attacks.
Fourth, the country’s important genetic resources and genetic data are at risk of loss.
In 2019, the regulations on the management of human genetic resources in China were revised again, which restricted foreign organizations and individuals from using human genetic resources in China to carry out scientific research activities. However, at present, the examination and approval supervision of the research results published by the State Key Laboratory and other units is not strict enough, especially the publication of academic papers supported by Chinese genetic samples in international journals, which threatens the national biosafety and genetic data security. The State Key Biological Laboratory and P4 High-grade Microbiological Laboratory have special functions for national security, and the strictest supervision and approval system for achievements must be implemented.
Fifth, the subversive defense technology of biosafety, key products and equipment, and major biosafety defense infrastructure are relatively backward.
Compared with developed countries, China’s technological capabilities in the whole chain, such as security threat perception, biosafety threat screening, biosafety hazard disposal and biosafety hazard protection, are weak, especially in the research and development and large-scale production of independent property rights of key equipment, which is "stuck in the west". At present, there are 15 biosafety level 4 laboratories and more than 1,300 biosafety level 3 laboratories in the United States. There are only three P4 biosafety laboratories and more than 40 P3 laboratories in China, and the strength gap is obvious.
Strengthen top-level design and strategic planning
Pay close attention to the formulation of China’s national top-level design and strategic planning for biosafety. According to the current situation of China’s biosafety defense and control, technology research and development, organizational system, public awareness, etc., the National Biosafety Strategic Planning Committee or specialized agency shall be established to prepare the national medium-and long-term strategic plan for biosafety. Comprehensive strategic planning is carried out from organizational administration, construction of various think tanks, laboratory platform group with national biosafety qualification, classified assessment of threat factors, risk screening and early warning, rapid response and detection and monitoring, threat eradication and mitigation, technology research and development, public education, reward and punishment rules, enterprise supervision, material reserve and other dimensions.
On February 22nd, the inspectors worked in the "Fire Eye" laboratory. "Fire Eye" Laboratory is a multi-party novel coronavirus testing laboratory Cheng Min/photo
Improve the biosafety supervision system and mechanism as soon as possible. China’s biosafety supervision system should be led by the government, with public safety as the core of supervision, and on the basis of balancing the benefits and risks of biotechnology, it should form the effect of "combining management with promotion" and a dynamic management and control mechanism. It is suggested to establish a national biosafety expert think tank and an administrative supervision system.
Increase relevant financial input. Vigorously develop subversive defense and control technologies in the field of biosafety, realize research and development and large-scale production of independent property rights of key equipment as soon as possible, and break the technological blockade of western countries. Accelerate the construction of national key laboratories, biological defense infrastructure platforms, biological defense advanced product research and development and production innovation centers. It is suggested that the state finance support and form a number of national think tanks in the field of biosafety, and strive to cultivate compound talents with backgrounds in life science and social science.
Revise the emergency regulations for public health emergencies and the wildlife protection law as soon as possible, and promptly introduce laws such as the Biosafety Law. Detailed provisions of public health events before, early, spread and stable period of the judgment criteria, government response mechanism. It is suggested that the implementation of wildlife protection law and its supporting laws and regulations should be comprehensively evaluated. Introduce the biosafety law as soon as possible and build a national biosafety legal system.
Establish a biosafety big data prevention and control early warning platform. Biosafety related departments can integrate the development of preparedness and defense technology and information at home and abroad, identify and evaluate major biosafety threats, and establish a digital platform that can respond in time, accurately warn and prevent and control safety. Establish a laboratory supervision platform to escort biotechnology innovation and product innovation. Integrate the relevant functions of health departments and scientific research institutes, and establish a public-oriented information security knowledge popularization and authoritative information release platform.
Promote the multilateral process of biological arms control. In 2001, the United States unilaterally refused to sign the Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, which resulted in a blank in the monitoring and verification mechanism for the implementation of the Convention and became a relatively weak link in the international non-proliferation system of weapons of mass destruction. China should promote the formulation of a legally binding protocol to the convention, including the verification mechanism, and support the establishment of a globally applicable legal mechanism through open and transparent intergovernmental negotiations. In this process, China can set up a professional team composed of experts from various fields, set up a number of non-governmental organizations and think tanks, and actively participate in relevant international legislation and consultation dialogues.(Author of the research group: Wang Fangzhong, Xue Yang, Zhang Xi, Zhang Weiwen; Zhang Jianxin also contributed to this article)(Published in Internal Edition of Half-monthly Talk, No.4, 2020)
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